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Nowadays, the current threat of international terrorism is set to a se-
vere level, demanding worldwide enhanced security. Radioactive materials
that could be fashioned into a radiation dispersal device typically emit
gamma rays, while fissile materials such as uranium and plutonium emit
both neutrons and gamma rays via spontaneous or induced fission. There-
fore, the detection and identification of hazardous materials has become
increasingly important. We present the results of GEANT4 Monte Carlo
simulation of an active neutron interrogation system based on highly seg-
mented neutron/gamma-ray detector and pulsed neutron generator. This
system is capable of detecting and imaging radioactive and special nuclear
materials, explosives and drugs. The segmented scintillation detector works
as a scatter camera, allowing selection of a gamma ray events that undergo
multiple interaction in detector blocks for radioactive source localization.
The detector consist of blocks made of plastic scintillator which provide
scattering and blocks of CsI, used as an absorber, used as an absorber,
which has to be efficient to detect the characteristic gamma radiation for
the identification. Because of this imaging capability background events
can be significantly rejected, decreasing the number of events required for
high confidence detection and thereby greatly improving its sensitivity. A
scatter imager for the detection of shielded radioactive materials has been
conceptualized, simulated, and refined to maximize sensitivity while mini-
mizing cost.
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1. Introduction
Lately the threat of international terrorism grows constantly, requiring
the increased safety in a whole world. Presently disorganization of state
administration, task of economic and political harm, compulsion of power
are the primary purposes of international terrorism to the change of pol-
icy. Bomb terrorism is one of the most widespread. Therefore detection of
explosives and threat materials inside luggage of an aircraft passengers has
become an essential requirement.
For the search of the hidden treads systems based on the direct methods
on the use of X-rays, vapor detection and sniffer dogs or on the use of nu-
clear quadrupole resonance have proved their efficiency [1, 2, 3]. However,
hermetical casing or impenetrable metallic shell make impossible exposure
of the hidden hazardous substances and limit the possibility of their de-
tection. In such cases the use of radiation with high ability to penetrate
and detect characteristic signs of interaction with chemical elements of haz-
ardous substances is necessary.
Prompt gamma-ray neutron analysis [4, 5] has been investigated for over
six decades as possible solution offering an on-stream, non-destructive, rapid
method for the luggage inspection at the airports. Objective of this type
of inspection is to determine small quantity of explosive of the order 200 g.
The basic problem faceing by this technique is that, the principal elements
which constitute explosives and illicit drugs (H, C, N and O) are present also
in the common materials, but with different concentrations. High density
and somewhat increased concentration of nitrogen is a characterization of
explosive substances. In addition, the background associated with gammas,
produced by neutron interaction with surrounding materials mask the sig-
nals form explosives. So, the spatial methods have to be applied to reduce
backgrounds to an acceptable level.
To overcome background different methods were developed. One ap-
proach provides Coded aperture imaging apparatus and methods for the
detection and imaging of radiation which results from nuclear interrogation
of a target object. This method allow to localize object and decrease back-
ground but on the expense of gamma ray signal intensity loss. Additional
shortcoming of this method is that changing the coded aperture masks is
required, that resulted in time duration increase for an inspection. Another
approach is the Associated Particle Imaging Method [6]. In this case the
characteristic gamma radiation is recorded in coincidence with the signal
from detector which register a particles from neutron production reaction
d + t → α + n. This method allow tomography of the explosive ob-
ject. The only shortcoming of this method is a high prices of the neutron
generator with α-particle detector embedded in.
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In this study, we have performed Monte Carlo simulation with the help
of GEANT4 package [7] neutron interrogation with fast 14.1 MeV neutrons
intended to check the luggage of aircraft passenger on presence of explosive
materials. For the detailed test on presence of explosives in the luggage
an electronic collimation method based on Compton scattering tracking is
developed for the reduction of background from gamma rays, produced by
neutron interactions with shielding materials.
2. Design of detection system
Detector (Fig. 1) consist of plastic scintillation rectangular bars with
size 5 × 5 × 20 cm3 covered by reflecting film of aluminum-backed Mylar
and film that contains gadolinium oxide and bars made of CsI or BGO
inorganic scintillator. Layer of air between scintillation bars and Mylar
ensures full internal scattering of photons. Bars should be connected into
one unit of 15 × 50 × 20 cm3 dimensions consisting of two rows of
plastic scintillator bars serving as a scatter, and last raw composed from
inorganic scintillator for high- efficiency absorption. Additionally plastic
scintillation bars are covered by film containing gadolinium oxide paint to
allow neutron detection. Such a design will make possible to select gammas
which have Compton scattered in plastic and absorbed in CsI scintillator.
Since gamma-rays with energy more then 3 MeV are scattered on small
angle the backprojection method allow to reconstruct the source location.
Fig. 1. Gamma-neutron detector scheme (rendered picture): 1 – PMT; 2 – light
sharing guide; 3 – scintillation bars.
Scintillation bars are sandwiched on both sides by continuous light guides
5 cm thick. At each side 10 photomultiplier tubes (PMT) are placed on top
of light guides to collect scintillation light. The light sharing guides allow
scintillation light produced in one or two bars to be transferred and shared
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Fig. 2. The 3-D visualization of GEANT4 simulation of of neutron interrogation
setup and particle tracking by VRML: 1-neutron generator in shield housing from
lead and borated polyethylene, 2 – detector, 3 – inspected object.
between all 20 PMTs almost simultaneously, forming scintillation photon
distribution pattern {m1;m2; : : : ;m20}. The detector design proposed is
based on application of Anger-logic algorithm which is widely applied in
detectors used for Positron Emission Tomography. The trajectories of the
particles under simulation, as well as the simulation geometry, can also be
visualized using the VRML visualization driver (see Fig. 2 for illustration).
3. Detector geometry simulation
Full simulations of the detector were performed using GEANT4 pack-
age [7]. The scintillation bars supposed to be made of PS-923A [8] plastic
scintillator produced by Amcrys company (Ukraine). They were modeled
as 95% polished and 5% diffuse (Lambertian). The optical properties of
aluminized Mylar film were taken from the RealSurface1.0 data set [9] of
Geant4 (PolishedVM2000). The data on bulk attenuation length (BAL) of
the scintillation 250-450 cm and light output 59% of anthracene, that cor-
respond to 104 optical photons/MeV were taken from [8]. The PMTs were
modeled as a 1 mm thick disk with 100% active area, made of borosilicate
glass BK7 with refractive index n = 1.52. The light detector was placed on
outer surface of the PMT glass BK7 and assigned as ideal absorber with
100% active surface and 25% efficiency to detect optical photons.
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4. Simulation of explosive detection
The Monte Carlo Geant4 Transport code has been used for the present
simulations. A D-T pulsed neutron generator operating at 108 neutrons per
second has been simulated as fixed point isotropic neutron source. The neu-
tron source was located inside the shield made of lead and borated polyethy-
lene with opening in form of cone, which serves as neutron flux collimator
to ensure that all area of 50 × 50 cm2 in size where luggage is located
will be covered. The emitted 14.1 MeV fast neutrons produce high energy
gamma ray signals as a result of the inelastic interaction of fast neutrons
with carbon, oxygen and nitrogen nuclei present in an explosive material.
The radiation shield made of lead and concrete is surrounding the detector
and volume where the luggage inspection take place.
Simulations were implemented in several stages. In the first stage the
Iron was considered as a shielding material. But in this case large continuous
background do not allow to resolve gamma lines. Then lead was used as a
shield. After careful choosing of shielding geometry the gamma lines from
C, N and O have became possible to resolve.
On Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we presented gamma spectra of simulation of two
second exposure to 14.1 MeV neutron flux of explosive RDX (C3H6N6O5),
and an explosive simulant melamin (C3H6N6) of 5 cm
3 in volume. To take
into account impact of common harmless materials on explosive detection
we have simulated the explosive placed inside the bag of 20 × 20 × 30
cm3 in size, filled with clothes simulated as a cotton of 0.2 g/cm3 density,
composed from cellulose cellophane and air, but no considerable impact on
detected spectra is found.
As seen from Fig. 3, the energy distribution is characterized by three
peaks in the spectrum: a peak in the total gamma energy absorption from
the line Eγ = 4, 43 MeV from
12C, a peak with Eγ = 5.10 MeV from
14N and
peak with Eγ = 6.13 MeV form
16O. The RDX spectrum (in blue color) has
characteristic gamma with Eγ = 6.13 MeV form
16O, but there is no such a
line present in the gamma spectrum of explosive simulant – melamin (in red
color). Another explosive materials used for the simulation are: ammonium
nitrate (H4N2O3), TNT (C7H5N3O6) and C4 (C4H6N6O6).
5. Electronic collimation
In short inspections during several second when the luggage is moving
through the detection area the precise chemical composition can not be
retrieved. In case of suspicion that luggage is containing illicit material the
luggage can be stopped at the inspection area and additional testing can
be performed during several minutes with applied electronic collimation for
background suppression.
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Fig. 3. The energy spectra of the RDX (blue) and Melamin (red)
Fig. 4. The energy spectra of the RDX after 120 seconds of testing with spatial
selection of gammas.
The simulation of gamma ray transport in the detection system results
in conclusion that approximately 16% of gammas produced by neutrons in-
teractions with inspected object are scattered first in plastic scintillation bar
and absorbed in CsI scintillator allowing reconstruction of source location.
This is due to the fact that high energy gammas of several MeV’s are scat-
tered mainly on small angles. Due to segmented design the effect of Comp-
ton scattering can be applied to select gammas coming from only inspected
area. For the source localization only coincidence events are selected. Coin-
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Fig. 5. Photoelectron distribution patterns {m1;m2; : : : ;m20}. The left column
indicates gamma ray orthogonal to detector surface and right column indicates
gamma ray beam hitting the detector surface under the angle of 10o.
cidence events are defined as events with non-zero energy deposit in exactly
one cell in either one of the scatter plastic scintillation bar, and exactly one
in the absorber layer. This ensures the events have gone through a Compton
scatter but also minimizes the chance of multiple-scattering events.
The effect of electronic collimation is illustrated on Fig.5. Gamma
quanta coming from different directions resulted in considerably different
scintillation photon distribution patterns. To be able to reconstruct the po-
sition of the gamma source in the inspection volume, the detector response
have to be calibrated as a function of gamma source position. This 3D sim-
ulated calibration set was then used to select gammas coming from inside
the inspected area by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE).
The energy spectra of the RDX after 120 seconds of additional testing
with spatial selection of gammas is presented on Fig.4. One can see that
all gamma peaks from C, N and O are resolved and their intensities can be
used for chemical analysis of inspected substances.
6. Method of delayed coincidences
The detection of concealed Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the air-
port passengers luggage is an important goal for prevention of a nuclear ter-
rorism. Fast neutrons emitted in the neutron induced fission on SNM can be
detected with plastic scintillator combined with Gd lined neutron-gamma
converter. Neutron detection and neutron-gamma discrimination can be
done with delayed-coincidence signature of two time correlated pulses, the
so called capture-gated method [13]. The prompt signal is produced by
8 georgadze printed on November 16, 2017
fast neutron scattering on protons in hydrogen reach plastic scintillator ma-
terial and delayed signal is produced by capture of thermalized incident
neutron on Gadolinium nucleus. The latter reaction leads to a cascade
of 2-3 gamma-rays emitted with total energies of 8.46 MeV (155Gd) and
7.87 MeV (157Gd) that are essentially bigger than energy of events from
natural radioactive background with upper limit of 3 MeV. Gd in natural
abundance can be used as active n-γ converter due to high abundance of
isotopes 157Gd (15.7%) and 155Gd (14.7%).
Another benefit of using this isotopes is the highest thermal neutron
capture cross-sections among all known nuclides, σcap = 254000 b and
σcap = 61000 b, respectively. In simulations we have considered neutron-
gamma converter as a thin film placed in between scintillation bars and
made of acrylic (PMMA) mixed with gadolinium oxide (Gd2O3) with a
Gd/scintillator weight ratio of 0.5%.
Scintillation bars geometry impact considerably on neutron detection
efficiency. With larger cross section of scintillation bar there is the high
probability of neutron to be captured by Hydrogen with emitting 2.2 MeV
gamma quantum which is difficult to detect due to high counting rate in
this energy region from natural background detection. Smaller cross section
results in increased light absorption and energy resolution degradation. For
chosen geometric dimensions of scintillation bars simulation results in prob-
ability of neutron capture on gadolinium of 0.88 and of an average time of
neutron capture - 26 µs. The efficiency of neutron detection is estimated to
be about 10-15%.
7. Enriched uranium detection
Modeling of detector function response to neutrons and gammas with
Monte-Carlo method shows that high effectiveness for gammas and neutrons
detection at the same time can be reached and discrimination between these
two particle types can be performed by application of capture-gated method
based on delayed coincidence of neutron scattering at protons of plastic
scintillator and reaction of neutrons capture by 155Gd and 157Gd nuclei.
Discrimination between gammas and neutrons can be reached due to dif-
ferent quantities of scintillation bars that detected events dealing with inter-
action of secondary particles with detector material. Preliminary modeling
of detector response with application of software code GEANT4 showed
that detection effectiveness of neutrons from SNM will be about 10%. Al-
though most fissile materials naturally emit neutrons and/or γ-rays, the
intensity of the spontaneous radiation is low, and the energies of the γ -rays
are fairly low in most cases. The active neutron interrogation approach
involves bombarding the sample with external neutron source and thereby
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inducing additional fission in the sample and counting the emitted neutrons
due to fission.
To test sensitivity of the system to presence of fissile materials the en-
riched uranium sample consisting of 10% of 238U and 90% of 235U with
the mass of 200 g was placed in the center of system inside the bag filled
with clothes. The clothes were simulated as 0.2 g/cm3 Cellulose cellophane
material taken from Geant4 material library mixed with air. The sam-
ple inside the luggage was irradiated with 108 of 14.1 MeV neutrons, placed
inside shield-collimator. Presently Differential Die-Away (DDA) active neu-
tron interrogation technique was not used for fissile content determination.
Instead of that the considerable growing of integral counting rate in the
whole energy range with characteristic peaks of full absorption of gammas
from neutron capture on gadolinium is an indication of presence of enriched
uranium.
8. Conclusions
According to preliminary modeling results of detector parameters, it was
determined that there is possibility to improve explosive detection effective-
ness at the account of electronic collimation for source localization in space
resulting in essential background reduction. For the neutron generator in-
tensity of 108 n/s, the 400 g of explosives hidden in a luggage can produce
alarm on presence of suspicious material. In a few minutes of the additional
test with applying the electronic collimation the chemical composition of the
object can be established. Additionally, 200 g of enriched uranium sample
can be found with the help of active neutron interrogation.
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